Polkassembly Logo

OpenGov
This proposal was still in progress when Polkassembly was archived. The status shown here is frozen and may not reflect the final on-chain outcome.
View All Big Spender

Kusama Shield Audit

inBig Spender
14 days ago
Deciding

Title Kusama Shield Audit

Summary:
The Kusama Shield project is a treasury funded project that has been developing a privacy protocol for assets on Kusama, Polkadot and Paseo. Being one of the first Zero Knowledge smart contract protocol on the hub. After some time of developing, the project is in need of a code audit, as we are dealing with production systems with real peoples assets. User safety is a big priority and therefore we are asking the community to help us fund a security audit by a cherry picked talented Zero Knowledge auditor.

Proposal Total USD Amount:
56605 USD

Amount of milestones:
1

X link:
https://x.com/KusamaShield

Previous proposals:
https://kusama.polkassembly.io/referenda/631 - 99% Aye
https://kusama.polkassembly.io/referenda/509 - 89% Aye

Cost comparison:
Moonbeam by SRLabs - https://dotpal.io/community_reports/2026-Q1 - 133,692 DOT

StorageHub’s codebase Audit - 385,978 USD - https://polkadot.subsquare.io/referenda/830
Ink 5 audit - 238,920 USD - https://polkadot.subsquare.io/referenda/1045
Zero Knowledge engineers costs 140 000 - 350 000 USD / source: https://jobcannon.io/careers/zero-knowledge-proof-engineer

The Kusama Shield project has done lots to squeeze the price without affecting the quality of the Audit.

Read full proposal here:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1yIEtCjgcXViHaNxKVkXYjS0UFhDVVuUsnVMMnuNC3EA/edit?usp=sharing

Comments (2)

8 days ago

Hi, all questions are welcome, here are some from the Kusama Vision coordinator:

1) Who exactly is the team (devs) who will be benefiting from the proposal?
Kusama Shield has since day one had anonymous contributors but 2 developers had been mainly developing the protocol, Because contributors specifically have requested not to be mentioned by name, which anonymous collaboration is something we encourage and want to continue doing but 2 developers have been mainly developing most of the code so far. The “how to contribute to Kusama Shield” mentions this: https://kusamashield.codeberg.page/contribute.html

2) Audit, can you share a signed quote ot auditors engagement letter, some terms, repos and can you clarify if its an official zkSecurity audit or Dvid working independently?

Good Question, David will be treated as an independent subcontractor both to be able to provide an audit like this at this price point but also to have the ability for the auditor to work directly with the developers, unlike an average audit where the developers just hand over a specification of what repos and code bases they want audited and then send it away, we want to do more than an audit, take David expertise in the Zero Knowledge field and improve the development process forever by adopting the best practices, tools and Quality Assurance that comes out of the audit.
In practice:
David company will sign a NDA while doing the audit with proposing entity Rust Syndicate LLC, a republic of Georgia based software company. Making sure all bugs are not disclosed until they are documented, patched and fixed in production before the Audit report is published. This is pretty standard practice to provide a legal enforceable protection between auditor(asked a legal expert in Georgia who explains how NDA's are enforced by saying: "Most NDA's are considered a civil matter which is not enforced by prison but the case could be escalated to a criminal offense if it can be claimed that it violates commercial secrets act").

Here is some references to previous stuff David has done:
https://hackmd.io/@teddav/ByzhQ-zMee

Audit portfolio is including:

  • Zcash Tachyon | https://seanbowe.com/blog/ragu-for-orchard-part1/
  • Self | https://self.xyz/
  • Aleo’s hyperlane bridge: https://github.com/hyperlane-xyz/hyperlane-aleo/
  • Celestia Zoda: https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/034
  • Solana Confidential transfers: https://reports.zksecurity.xyz/reports/anza-solana-token2022/

Full list:
https://teddav.github.io/portfolio/

Scope:
The scope of the audit is covering the smart contracts and the Zero Knowledge implementation, David will come in and work his magic and produce the needed audit after this, all the findings will squashed out by the dev squad.

3) Why is audit done after launch and not before? What user funds are now exposed?

Previous proposal included an audit milestone which before the proposal was submitted the audit milestones was requested to be moved to an independent milestone, where an idea was laid out that another entity would pay for the audit, this ran out in the sand and because the usage is growing, the Kusama Shield project want to guarantee that there has been done a comprehensive audit and that's the reason for this proposal. In order to be able to test full compatibility with all types of Polkadot assets and special cases, we went live to see how the protocols behave in production. Also to be able to build and optimize the SDK’s for Kusama and polkadot, we have right now made lots of improvement in Transaction creation time(/optimizing for faster ZK tx generation). By not having a previous audit

4) What's the project's current usage? current tvl? number of users and txs?
We have soft commitments from projects, but since most larger project really insist on integrating with Audited projects.. Here is some user numbers:
Paseo: ~ 4-5000 shielded transactions
Polkadot: ~200 shielded tx on the latest pool(the v7 contracts) | ~500 swaps | offramps user we dont know
Kusama: not sure, will update once knowing

Also note we have done 7 iterations, that means 7 different smart contracts has been deployed etc. We do have a telegram app for shielded gifts ready to launch after the audit since user funds and security should be number one.

5) Can you link two previous audit reports, including findings?
Here is a summary of some of the stuff that has been previously found and patched:

Name of IssueInfoSeverityFixed
Anyone can insert into Merkle treePeople could spam the storage of the contract by inserting fake depositshighThe merkle tree was fixed to only allow the shielded pool to interact with it and noone else
Merkle tree status bugValidation of the on-chain tree failedmediumWas fixed in v7
Withdraw skips amount check for unknown nullifierMissed double spending bug foundhighFixed by redoing the zk circuits to design them to store nullifiers at the end
Deposits linked to withdrawals via nullifierHashBug affecting the linkability between user and txhighFixed
Poseidon hashing parametersA small part of the poseidon on-chain hasher was wrong, this was later fixedlowSome changes in the risc-v side was made to provide a more stable zk plugin that we use

High level zk circuit explanation:
V5/V6 (VULNERABLE):
Deposit: [nullifierHash] → public on-chain + stored in contract
Withdraw: [nullifierHash] → public in tx calldata
Linkability: MATCH! → Privacy broken

V7 (FIXED):
Deposit: [commitment only] → nullifierHash NEVER sent to chain
Withdraw: [nullifierHash] → only revealed at withdraw
Linkability: IMPOSSIBLE → Privacy preserved

We also have a list of minor bugs that was found by the following frameworks that scans every file changed:
https://github.com/ConsenSysDiligence/mythril
https://github.com/crytic/slither
https://trailofbits.com/tools/circomspect/

~flipchan

10 hours ago

Aye:

  1. reasonable audit cost,
  2. the list of issues found in prior audits warrants another one, now that it's on mainnet and the project has had further optimizations applied
  3. privacy on Kusama, 'nuff said

Polkassembly is now a read-only archive. Commenting is disabled.

Voting Period

Decision Period

28 / 28 days

Confirmation Period

5 / 7 days

Help Center

Report an Issue
Feedback
Terms and Conditions
Github

Our Services

Docs
Terms of Website
Privacy Policy

Polkassembly · Archived 2026 · polkassembly.io

Terms and ConditionsTerms of Website
Privacy Policy